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Event Ontology based on Four-Dimensionalism
Yasuo NAKAYAMA
1. Introduction
Donald Davidson (1980) developed an event-based semantics. According to Davidson, we can 
quantify over events as well as things. In this paper, we extend this view and formalize an ultimate 
form of event-based ontology. Not only do we accept events as concrete objects and consider 
things as special kinds of events, but we also interpret the whole four-dimensional universe as the 
maximal event and all concrete objects as parts of the universe. Using this framework, it is easy to 
see that this event-based ontology is compatible with both perduarantism1) and eternalism2).
In this paper, we propose an axiomatic theory for Four-Dimensional Event Ontology (4EO). 
This theory is based on General Extensional Mereology (GEM) for (four-dimensionally extended) 
events. It turns out that 4EO is a very expressive framework. We then develop an event-based 
ontology that interprets things as four-dimensionally extended events. When we interpret the 
history of a thing as a four-dimensionally extended event, we can describe its states and changes 
by ascribing certain properties to its temporal parts. 
 
2. Arguments for Event-based Ontology
There are different concepts of events. In this paper, we assume the existence of the four-
dimensional universe and identify an event through its spatio-temporal location in the universe. 
Events exist as parts of the universe, which is the maximal event. However, in order to refer to an 
event, we need a (four-dimensional) sortal or a (four-dimensional) mass predicate that characterizes 
types of referred events. Things can be interpreted as a special kind of events. For example, we 
can interpret a human as the whole life of an individual person. In other words, we can identify a 
human with the whole spatio-temporal extension of this individual person. In this case, the term 
"human" is a sortal that picks out such a spatio-temporal extension. 
It is clear that this ontological view presupposes the eterrnalism. It is also clear that this view is 
compatible with a four-dimensional mereology. For, according to this view, all concrete entities are 
events (in the broad sense) and all events are four-dimensionally extended. In four-dimensionalism, 
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there are a worm theory and a stage theory3). Our view belongs to a worm theory. We assume that 
an event can be identifi ed as a four-dimensionally extended object by using a linguistic device such 
as a sortal. At fi rst, the whole four-dimensional event of a cretin type is identifi ed. After that, we 
can talk about its temporal parts. For example, when we refer to the whole life of Arthur N. Prior, 
we can talk about his student time. In this sense, the (four-dimensional) whole is ontologically 
more fundamental than its temporal parts. In Section 5 of this paper, we point out that this 
ontological view is not identical with our epistemological view. However, this kind of discrepancy 
between ontology and epistemology can be also found in many mathematical systems based on the 
classic logic and therefore nothing unusual. Our common understanding of objects might have its 
source in both our ontological and our epistemological view.
In ordinary language, we use expressions for physical objects and events. Semantically, both 
kinds of reductionism seem possible. In this paper, we reduce physical objects to events. One of 
aims of this paper is to show how to describe physical objects as four-dimensional events4).
3. Formal Frameworks for Event-based Ontology
In this section we develop the Four-Dimensional Event Ontology (4EO). 4EO is based 
on General Extensional Mereology (GEM), Theory for Temporal Objects (TTO), and Four-
Dimensional Theory for Events (4TE)5). 
3.1 The General Extensional Mereology
The General Extensional Mereology is a standard theory of mereology (Casati and Varzi 
1999: Chapter 3; Varzi 2016). In the following description, (X.An) indicates an axiom and (X.Dn) 
indicates a defi nition. We use P as the part relation, which is the primitive relation in mereology.
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In this paper, we deal with two GEMs, a GEM for temporal objects and a GEM for events. 
3.2 The Theory for Temporal Objects
Now, we defi ne the Theory for Temporal Objects (TTO). We use T, T1, T2, T3, … as variables 
for temporal objects.
We use t, t1, t2, t3, … as variables for time points. Now, we introduce axioms for the simple 
B-theory6). The simple B-theory says that atomic times are linearly ordered.
Now, we can prove Proposition 1. 
[Proposition1] 
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Proof.  We show (TTO.P1) by induction. Suppose T1 is a time point. Then, the claim holds 
because of the refl ectivity of P. Next, we assume that the claim holds for Ta. We set Tb = Ta + tb 
and Tc = Ta + tc. Suppose that t (P(t, Tb)  P(t, Tc)). Then, tb = tc. Thus, because of (GEM.D7), 
Tb = Tc. Hence, (TTO.P1) holds. (TTO.P2) follows from (TTO.P1). (TTO.P3) follows from 
(GEM.A1), (TTO.A1) and (TTO.D3). (TTO.P4) follows from (TTO.P3) and (TTO.D2). (TTO.
P5) follows from(TTO.P2) and (TTO.D3).  Q.E.D.
3.3 The Four-Dimensional Theory for Events
Now, we introduce the Four-Dimensional Theory for Events (4TE). We use E, E1, E2, E3, … as 
variables for events7). In 4TE, P and exist are primitive relations.
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Proposition 2 can be derived from these axioms and defi nitions.
[Proposition 2]
Now, we can defi ne tenses as relations between a time point and an event. 
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We defi ne spatial part as part relation between instantaneous events.
3.4 The Four-Dimensional Event Ontology
As the first step, we define mereological predicates as predicates that are applicable to 
mereological sums.
We can show that General Extensional Mereology (GEM) holds for F-objects, when F is a 
mereological predicate.
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We distinguish sortals and mass predicates. For example, "human" is a sortal and "water" is a 
mass predicate. 
According to Grandy (2016), there are three characterizations of sortal.
(1a) A sortal tells us what essence of a thing is.
(1b) A sortal tells us how to count things of that kind, which requires knowing which things are 
different and which are the same.
(1c) A sortal tells us when something continues to exist, and when it goes out of existence.
In this paper, we distinguish substance sortals and phase sortals. Both are kinds of sortals. We 
interpret that substance sortals satisfy (1b) and (1c). This view is in agreement with the view of 
Strawson (1959) (Grandy 2016: Section 3.1). A phase sortal satisfi es only characterization (1b). A 
substance sortal is a sortal that is used for individuation of objects. Thus, a substance sortal is more 
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fundamental than phase sortal8).
(4EO.D13) [Phase Sortal] F is a phase sortal iff there is a substance sortal G such that E1(F(E1)
"cat" is a substance sortal, while "kitten" is a phase sortal. The term "cat" is used to identify 
an object, while the term "kitten" is used to characterize a temporal part of a cat. Kitten is a phase 
sortal, because when a cat matures it ceases to be a kitten but it does not go out of existence (Grandy 
2016: Section 4).
It is commonly accepted that there are two kinds of objects, namely things and events. 
However, in this paper, we consider all objects are events in the broad sense. A typical example of 
a thing is a desk and a typical example of an event in the narrow sense is a concert. A concert is 
performed by musicians during a time interval. We can refer to the whole concert and talk about its 
temporal parts. We propose to take the same view for a desk. A desk is spatio-temporally extended 
and we consider the whole four-dimensional extension of the desk as an individual desk. 
We propose to relativize IS-A and INSTANCE-OF relations by sortals.
We can explain the notion of counting by the cardinality of sortal objects, which can be 
recursively defi ned as follows.
The temporal homogeneity characterizes the internal structure of events in the narrow sense. 
This notion can be defi ned in the same way as the general homogeneity (See (4EO.D12) and (4EO.
D17)).
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(4EO.D17) [General Homogeneity] An object denoted by [F] is generally homogeneous iff F is  
       a mass predicate. 
Many authors classify events into four classes, namely achievements, accomplishments, 
activities and states. We can characterize achievements as instantaneous events, namely it holds: if 
E is an achievement, then E is an instantaneous event. If an event is an activity or a state, then the 
event is temporally homogeneous. An accomplishment can be interpreted as a fusion of an activity 
and an achievement. Casati and Varzi (2015) appropriately characterizes these four classes of 
events:
An activity, such as John's walking uphill, is a homogeneous event: its sub-events satisfy 
the same description as the activity itself and has no natural fi nishing point or culmination. 
An accomplishment, such as John's climbing the mountain, may have a culmination, but 
is never homogeneous. An achievement, such as John's reaching the top, is a culminating 
event (and is therefore always instantaneous). And a state, such as John's knowing the 
shortest way, is homogeneous and may extend over time, but it makes no sense to ask how 
long it took or whether it culminated. (Casati and Varzi 2015: Section 2.1)
Predicates of achievements and accomplishments are phase sortals. This is shown by the fact 
that achievements and accomplishments can be counted. We can illustrate the ontological view of 
this paper by the following two taxonomical schemas (See Figure 1 and Figure 2).
 
Figure 1.  Ontological Taxonomy
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Figure 2.  Taxonomy of expressions
4. Some Applications of Four-Dimensional Event Ontology
There are different forms of four-dimensionalism. Usually, worm theory and stage theory 
are distinguished (Sider 2001). Many metaphysicians accept that events are four-dimensionally 
extended. Because we claim that all concrete objects are events, it is natural to accept four-
dimensionalism for concrete objects.
We propose to identify things with four-dimensionally (extended) events that are picked out 
by substance sortals. For example, a person is identifi ed with the whole life of the person. As a 
result, we can easily describe the biology of a person in 4EO. As an example, let us take the life 
of English philosopher, J. M. E. McTaggart. We assume that McTaggart denotes the whole life of 
McTaggart. We also assume that London refers to a four-dimenisonal object.
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In these descriptions, we assume that the indexical now refers to the speaker time. For example, 
when these sentences are uttered by A at time t1, we interpret now = t1. We can also say that born, 
die, and publish are relations that express accomplishments and study expresses an activity.
5. Four-Dimensional Epistemology
The Four-Dimensional Event Ontology (4EO) expresses an ontological position. We propose 
to combine 4EO with a four-dimensional epistemology, because we think that the appearance of 
peculiarity of 4EO comes from a lack of an appropriate epistemology9).
The epistemology for 4EO can be characterized through (3a), (3b), (3c), (3d), and (3e). 
(3a) Agents are four-dimensional objects. Thus, they are parts of the universe.
(3b) Every agent belongs to a reference frame.
(3c) When an agent exists at a time point, he can make an observation at the time point. 
(3d) The present for a temporal part of an agent is the time point at which he can make an 
observation. 
(3e) The set of observations made by an agent continuously expands until his death. This 
expansion of the observation set expresses the dynamic aspect of time. 
This epistemological view of 4EO can be characterized as an internal view of the universe. 
According to these theses, agents exist in the universe as four-dimensional objects. A temporal 
part of an agent can observe certain events at a time point. It follows from (3d) that a temporal part 
of an agent can make an observation only in the present. Thus, the present has this epistemological 
superiority. However, the present has no ontological superiority10).
Now, let us assume that OS(A, t) be the set of observations that have been made by the agent 
A until time point t. If A is alive at time point t1 and t2 and t1 < t2, then OS(A, t1) ⊆ OS(A, t2). This 
is because every past event remains as a past event. Thus, every past observation remains as an 
element of the set of observations. Hence, the observation set monotonically increases11). 
On one hand, from the epistemological viewpoint, any model of the eternalism is mere 
theoretical constructions and not empirically provable. For no future event is directly observable. 
The epistemological view corresponds to the internal view, because observations are always 
made from the internal view. On the other hand, from the viewpoint of an observer, the future is 
unknown. Thus, the universe experienced by an observer has the structure of the growing universe 
theory, although these experiences do not justify the growing universe theory interpreted as an 
ontological thesis. 
Observation apparatuses are spatiotemporally located in the universe and we may replace 
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observers through observation apparatuses. Thus, not the agency itself but the internal locality of 
an observation is important for epistemological considerations.
6. Four-Dimensional Indexicalism
According to Merricks (1995), the indexicalism (the indexical view of the present) claims that 
the present time is simply one time among many and that being present is simply being this time. 
Here, I combine the indexicalism with 4EO and propose the Four-Dimensional Indexicalism (4DI) 
(see Nakayama 2012b). 
According to 4DI, an observer makes an observation in a spatiotemporal part of the universe. 
By the way, this is the view supported by the relativity theory. The present is a time point where 
an observer makes observations. According to 4EO, an action is an event and an event is a four-
dimensional entity. 
When act1 is an action, we denote the agent of the action by agent(act1). Then, we can defi ne 
truth conditions for tensed sentences as follows: 
(4a) The statement “I am tired” produced by an utterance act1 is true  iff  there is a four-
dimensional object E such that [E is a temporal part of agent(act1) & E is tired & the 
utterance time is a part of the occurrence time of E], namely E (TP(E, agent(act1)) ⋀ 
tired(E) ⋀ P(exist-time(act1), exist-time(E))). 
(4b) The statement “I was tired” produced by an utterance act1 is true  iff  there is a four-
dimensional object E such that [E is a temporal part of agent(act1) & E is tired & the 
utterance time is before the occurrence time of E], namely E (TP(E, agent(act1)) ⋀ 
tired(E) ⋀ exist-time(act1) < exist-time(E)). 
(4c) The statement “I will be tired” produced by an utterance act1 is true  iff  there is a four-
dimensional object E such that [E is a temporal part of agent(act1) & E is tired & the 
utterance time is after the occurrence time of E], namely E (TP(E, agent(act1)) ⋀ tired(E) 
⋀ exist-time(E) < exist-time(act1)). 
Note that the standard semantic treatment of indexicals proposed by Kaplan is quite abstract 
(Kaplan 1989), while the above formulation can describe how the values of contextual information 
are determined. 4DI interprets context as context of an utterance. The context gives information 
for evaluation of uttered sentences, because an utterance takes place in a particular spatio-temporal 
part of the universe. This is why the tensed view becomes necessary for interpretation of tensed 
sentences. 
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7. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have proposed a formulation of four-dimensional event-based ontology. We 
have also demonstrated how to combine this ontology with a four-dimensional epistemology. A 
formal description of sortals in a mereological framework was recently proposed in Nakayama 
(2009). In this paper, we have improved this approach and combined sortals with an event-based 
ontology. 
Ontological studies tend to focus on things. In this paper, we have shown more general ontology 
that includes both things and events as particulars. In this framework, the universe is defi ned as the 
maximal event and all other concrete objects are considered as parts of the universe. The proposed 
framework, the Four-Dimensional Event Ontology (4EO), clarifies metaphysical presuppositions 
and semantics of natural languages. By introducing a four-dimensional epistemology, we could 
describe not only static but also dynamic aspects of human activities.
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Notes
1)According to Hawley (2015), perdurantists believe that ordinary things like animals, boats and 
planets have temporal parts (things persist by ‘perduring’). 
2)Eternalists claim that objects from both the past and the future exist just as much as present 
objects and that temporal location matters not at all when it comes to ontology (Markosian 2016).
3)For the distinction between the worm theory and the stage theory, see Sider (2001). David Lewis 
and W.V.O. Quine are advocators of the worm theory and T. Sider supports the stage theory.
4)A part of discussions in this paper is based on Nakayama (2012a, 2013, 2015).
5)It is also possible to defi ne time as a sum of (simultaneous) events. This kind of formulation is 
sketched in Nakayama (2009: Chapter 2).
6)This notion of B-theory comes from McTaggart's distinction between A series and B series 
(McTaggart 1927). See Poidevin and Macbeath (1993), Mellor (1998), and Nakayama (2005, 
2015). 
7)In this paper, we use two-sorted logic. However, in general, many-sorted logic is reducible to the 
First-Order Logic by relativization. We consider temporal objects as instrumental objects. Thus, in 
this paper, only events in the broad sense are considered as concrete objects.
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8)Substance sortals are sortals that Wiggins (1967) regards as crucial. A phase sortal typically only 
applies to some temporal parts of an object. See Grandy (2016: Section 4). 
9)The discussion in Section 5 and 6 is based on Nakayama (2014b).
10)The presentism claims the ontological superiority of the present. However, we accept only the 
epistemological superiority of the present and deny its ontological superiority.
11) For this discussion, see Nakayama (2014a).
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Donald Davidson (1980) developed an event-based semantics. According to Davidson, we can 
quantify over events as well as things. In this paper, we extend this view and formalize an ultimate 
form of event-based ontology. Not only do we accept events as concrete objects and consider 
things as special kinds of events, but we also interpret the whole four-dimensional universe as the 
maximal event and all concrete objects as parts of the universe. Using this framework, it, is easy to 
see that this event-based ontology is compatible with both perduarantism and eternalism.
In Section 3 of this paper, we defi ne an axiomatic theory for Four-Dimensional Event Ontology 
(4EO). This theory is based on General Extensional Mereology (GEM) for (four-dimensionally 
extended) events. We then develop an event-based ontology that interprets things as four-
dimensionally extended events. When we interpret the history of a thing as a four-dimensionally 
extended event, we can describe its states and changes by ascribing certain properties to its 
temporal parts. 
A formal description of sortals in a mereological framework was recently proposed by 
Nakayama (2009). In this paper, we improve this approach and combine a theory of sortals with an 
event-based ontology. It turns out that 4EO is a very expressive framework and can be applied to 
the formal representation of sentences in natural languages (See Section 4 and 6).
Ontological studies tend to focus on things. In this paper, we describe more general ontology 
that includes both things and events as particulars. In this framework, the universe is defi ned as the 
maximal event and all other concrete objects are considered as parts of the universe. The proposed 
framework, 4EO, clarifi es metaphysical presuppositions and the semantics of natural languages (See 
Section 5). By introducing a four-dimensional epistemology, we can describe not only static but 
also dynamic aspects of human activities. 
